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Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules Through Technology
Joel R. Reidenberg*
I. Introduction to Lex Informatica
During the middle ages, itinerant merchants traveling across Europe
to trade at fairs, markets, and sea ports needed common ground rules to
create trust and confidence for robust international trade. The differences
among local, feudal, royal, and ecclesiastical law provided a significant
degree of uncertainty and difficulty for merchants. Custom and practices
evolved into a distinct body of law known as the "Lex Mercatoria," which
was independent of local sovereign rules and assured commercial partici-
pants of basic fairness in their relationships.'
In the era of network and communications technologies, participants
traveling on information infrastructures confront an unstable and uncertain
environment of multiple governing laws, changing national rules, and con-
flicting regulations. For the information infrastructure, default ground
rules are just as essential for participants in the Information Society as
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. This paper was prepared and funded during
a Fordham University Faculty Fellowship and as part of a sabbatical in the Public Policy Research
Department at AT&T Network Services Research Laboratory. I am particularly indebted to Paul
Resnick at AT&T for discussions of the paper, guidance on technical issues, and comments on earlier
drafts. In addition, I want to thank Ira Heffan, Bob Gellman, Mark Lemley, Larry Lessig, and Paul
Schwartz for comments on earlier drafts. Any errors remain the sole responsibility of the author.
1. See Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions
(Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 274-77 (1978).HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  553 1997-1998
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Lex Mercatoria was to merchants hundreds of years ago.2 Confusion and
conflict over the rules for information flows run counter to an open, robust
Information Society. Principles governing the treatment of digital informa-
tion must offer stability and predictability so that participants have enough
confidence for their communities to thrive, just as settled trading rules gave
confidence and vitality to merchant communities. At present, three sub-
stantive legal policy areas are in a critical state of flux in the network
environment. The treatment of content, the treatment of personal
information, and the preservation of ownership rights each presents con-
flicting policies within nations and shows a lack of harmonization across
national borders. In addition, serious jurisdictional obstacles confront the
enforcement of any substantive legal rights in the network environment.'
But just as clear accounting rules reassured participants in twentieth century
financial markets, ground rules for the access, distribution, and use of
information will shape the trust, confidence, and fairness in the twenty-first
century digital world for citizens, businesses, and governments.
Historically, law and government regulation have established default
rules for information policy, including constitutional rules on freedom of
expression and statutory rights of ownership of information.4 This Article
will show that for network environments and the Information Society,
however, law and government regulation are not the only source of rule-
making. Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules
on participants.5 The creation and implementation of information policy
2. On the essential role and establishment of information policy default rules, see generally Joel
R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in the
Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 105, 107 (1995); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and
Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 917-18 (1996).
3. For an excellent treatment of personal jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdictional problems in
the United States, see Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (1996).
4. See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS (1996); M. ETHAN KATSH,
LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995).
5. See Larry Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 896-97 (1996)
(arguing that software codes are societal constraints); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First
Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335 (exploring the role of
software in structuring speech in the on-line environment); Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 918, 927-28
(arguing that technical standards set boundary rules and embed policy choices). Some argue that
technical standards and legal rules may either supplement each other or, in some circumstances, be
substitutes. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the
Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 301-04 (1993) [hereinafter Reidenberg,
Rules of the Road] (arguing that technical considerations establish normative standards which, in turn,
impact system practice); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REv. 497, 508-09 (1995) (arguing that legal rules may be supple-
mented by technical considerations as well as business practices); Ann Cavoukian, Go Beyond
Security-Build in Privacy: One Does Not Equal the Other, CardTech/SecurTech '96 Conference (May
14-16, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (describing technological innovations and arguing
for them to be built into systems and applications to enhance privacy). The Canadian government is,
for example, exploring technological options for information privacy. See Ministerial Conference on
Global Information Networks, Bonn, Germany (July 7, 1997) (statement of John Manley, Canadian
[V/ol. 76:553
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are embedded in network designs and standards as well as in system
configurations. Even user preferences and technical choices create
overarching, local default rules.6 This Article argues, in essence, that the
set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and communica-
tion networks form a "Lex Informatica" that policymakers must
understand, consciously recognize, and encourage.7
The Article begins in Part II with a sketch of the information policy
problems inherent in the legal regulation of content, personal information,
and intellectual property on global networks. Part II proceeds to show
specific technical solutions and responses to these policy problems as an
illustration of the rule-making power of technology and networks. These
illustrations serve as a prelude to the articulation of a theory of Lex
Informatica.
Part III then defines the theoretical foundation for Lex Informatica by
showing technological constraints as a distinct source of rules for informa-
tion flows. Lex Informatica intrinsically links rule-making capabilities well
suited for the Information Society with substantive information policy
choices. Lex Informatica may establish a single, immutable norm for
information flows on the network or may enable the customization and
automation of information flow policies for specific circumstances that
adopt a rule of flexibility.
Part IV applies the theory to demonstrate how Lex Informatica can be
a useful policy device. The characteristics of Lex Informatica provide
ways to accommodate different national public policies for controversial
problems, such as content restrictions, 8 the treatment of personal
Minister of Industry) (on file with the Texas Law Review). Industry Canada has also held an important
symposium on privacy enhancing technologies. SeeBig Brother: Friend orFoe?, I INDUSTRY CANADA
UPDATE 2, 1-2 (Oct. 1, 1996) <http://www.ic.gc.ca/ic-data/welcomeic.ns>.
6. For example, a telephone subscriber's choice between per line and per call blocking of caller
identification information creates a default rule applicable to all users of the particular telephone line.
Per line blocking means no information is conveyed; per call blocking requires the caller to act affirma-
tively to block information for each call.
7. This Article will not address the specific role of community ethos and norms in setting network
rules. For a discussion of these aspects, see Edward J. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: Understanding the
Internet Community, I FIRsT MONDAY 5, 10-13 (Oct. 7, 1996) <http://www.firstmonday.dk/issuesl
issue4/valauskas/index.html > (discussing the role of Internet community practices in normalizing on-
line behavior).
8. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (upholding the findings of a three-judge
panel that provisions of the Communications Decency Act proscribing transmission of "indecent"
material were overly broad and thus violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech); Shea
v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reviewing the Communications Decency Act under a
standard applicable to content-based legislation), aft'd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997). Other countries may
also have additional content concerns, such as Germany's and France's prohibitions on holocaust denial
and Germany's restrictions on neo-Nazi expression. See Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, June 12,
1996, Ref. 53061-96 (discussing Art. 24 of the law of July 24, 1881 and its application to anti-Semitic
and revisionist messages), available in <http:l/www.aui.frlGroupeslGT-RPSIUEJFI
ordonnance.hrml >; Ulrich Karpen, Freedom of Expression as a Basic Right: A German View, 37 AM.
J. COMP. L. 395, 399 (1989) (discussing restrictions on the right of free speech in Germany);
1998]
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information,9 and the protection of intellectual property' ° circulating on
transnational networks. As a consequence, policymakers can and should
look to Lex Informatica as a useful extra-legal instrument that may be used
to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge conventional laws and
attempts by governments to regulate across jurisdictional lines.
The rise of a new regulatory regime for information policy has strik-
ing implications for public officials and government policy. Part V
explores redirecting public policy rule-making strategies. Because the
formulation of the substantive rules of Lex Informatica bypasses customary
legal regulatory processes, the traditional law approach, such as
government-issued decisions, will be less effective in achieving desired
information policy results than a technological approach, such as the
promotion and development of flexible, customizable systems. Technical
standards and standard-setting mechanisms acquire important political
characteristics. For the development of information policy rules in Lex
Informatica, policymakers must use strategies and mechanisms that are
different from traditional regulatory approaches.
II. Information Policy Problems and Technical Solutions
Cyberspace, as the virtual world is known, enables beneficial as well
as nefarious activities to thrive. Global networks are a powerful infra-
structure for national and transnational human interactions involving
commerce, entertainment, and politics. The regulation of content on
networks, the circulation of personal information, and the distribution of
intellectual property raise profound conflicts for national and international
law. The substantive standards, jurisdictional authority, and enforcement
Christopher P. Winner, Contemporary Views of Holocaust Are in Constant State of Flux, USA TODAY,
Feb. 17, 1997, at 8A (discussing the sentencing of a German neo-Nazi for inciting racial hatred).
9. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter European Privacy Directive] (attempting to harmonize
the protection of personal information within the European Union); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R.
REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF U.S. DATA PROTECTION (1996) (exploring the
approach taken by American law to the problem of protecting privacy in a modem, computerized era
and comparing that approach to European standards); Symposium, Data Protection Law and the
European Union's Directive: The Challenge for the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995)
(debating data privacy issues as they relate to the European Directive).
10. See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (canvassing the current law of copyright, patent,
trademark, and trade secret and making recommendations for possible changes to the Secretary of
Commerce); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to ReadAnonymously: A CloserLook at "Copyright Management"
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1019-30 (1996) (arguing that legal protection for copyright-
management technologies might violate the First Amendment); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab,
WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134 (arguing that Congress should wait to see what kind of free market
protections evolve before pursuing the White Paper's legislative recommendations).
556 [Vol. 76:553
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powers all clash. Just as technology creates and compounds these
conflicts, technology also offers new solutions for information policy rules
in these controversial legal arenas.
A. Content
1. A Basic Policy Dilemma.-The legal regulation of content on
global networks poses intricate philosophical, practical, and political
complications. Censorship of information is anathema in some legal
cultures, like the United States," but not in others, like Singapore and
China.'2 Even within any single jurisdiction, the regulation of informa-
tion content poses a fundamental political issue for democratic societies.
For example, in the United States, concerns over the easy access that
children had to pornography and obscenity on the Internet resulted in the
Communications Decency Act,' 3 which imposed liability on information
service and access providers who were conduits to the dissemination of
offensive material to minors. Two separate federal courts have held the
statute unconstitutional on various grounds, 4 and the Supreme Court has
affirmed that the indecency section of the statute violates the First
Amendment with its overbroad sweep-without reaching the argument that
it violates the Fifth Amendment as well."' The Supreme Court let stand
the prohibitions on obscenity.'6 Yet at the same time, the operator of a
pornographic bulletin board may be held liable for trafficking in illegal
content across state lines."'
11. See U.S. CONSr. amend. I (prohibiting governmentally imposed restrictions on speech).
12. Singapore has recently required all Internet traffic to pass through monitored gateways. See
Silencing the Net: The Threat to Freedom of Expression On-line, 8 HUM. RTS. WATCH 2, 46-50
(May 1996) <http://www.epic.org/freespeech/intl/hrwreport_5_96.htnl> [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH]; see also Poh-Kam Wong, Implementing the NII Vision: Singapore's Experience and
Future Challenges, Paper presented at Harvard Symposium on National and International Initiatives for
the Information Infrastructure (Jan. 24-26, 1996) (discussing Singapore's governmental policy toward
public access to network content), available in <http://ksgwww.harvard.eduliip/Glfconf/
wongpap.html>. China similarly filters all in-bound and out-bound Internet traffic. See Minutes of
the 21st Meeting of the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications 5,
Paris, (Apr. 3, 1997) (report of Stephen Lau, Data Protection Commissioner of Hong Kong)
[hereinafter Minutes] (on file with the Texas Law Review).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 189 (1996) ("[Rlequiring that access restrictions be imposed
to protect minors from exposure to indecent material... merely puts it in its appropriate place: away
from children."); see also Communications Decency Act § 502, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp.
1997).
14. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aft'd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997); ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aft'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
15. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2347 (1997).
16. Id. at 2350.
17. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir.) (rejecting the defendant's claim that
obscenity must be judged against the standards of a cyberspace community rather than a geographic
community), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  557 1997-1998
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A similar debate is raging in France with the passage of the new
Telecommunications Reform Act, t" which requires information service
providers to offer technical means for users to filter content. 19 The
French Constitutional Court, however, struck down companion sections
regulating indecency for reasons of separation of powers and vagueness. 20
Nevertheless, two presidents of Internet service providers were indicted
under existing French law for making illegal material available over their
networks.2  Elsewhere, at least one country-Singapore-has sought to
monitor all information content entering its physical jurisdiction.
Singapore requires the registration of all Internet service providers and also
monitors their activities in Singapore.'
While these debates are just beginning in national capitals around the
world, the practical implications are significant. Global access to informa-
tion content means that information providers may face liability for actions
that, although legal where performed, were illegal where viewed.'
Fundamental political freedoms in one jurisdiction thus may be threatened
by the risk of liability in another jurisdiction. In other words, network
service providers may opt for the overly cautious route of self-censorship
and adopt policies of "when in doubt, take it out."
2. A Technical Solution.-The Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS) is a prime example of a technological solution designed to resolve
the policy problem of accommodating different standards for content with-
out compromising free speech values.24 A consortium of computer-
science scholars and industry representatives designed PICS to facilitate the
selective blocking of access to information on the Internet and to provide
an alternative to legal restrictions on the dissemination of content on the
Internet. PICS is a set of technical specifications that define a standard
18. Law No. 96-659 of July 26, 1996, art. 15, J.O., July 27, 1996, p. 11384, available in LEXIS,
Loireg Library, JO File.
19. See id. at art. 15.
20. Cons. const., D6cision No. 96-378 DC, July 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, Public Library,
Consti File, and in <http:/lwww.conseil-constitutionnel.frldecisions/96196378.doc>.
21. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12. Similarly, the head of CompuServe's
German subsidiary was indicted for facilitating the trafficking in pornography. See Edmund L.
Andrews, CompuServe Unit Chief Is Indicted in Germany, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 17, 1997, at
13, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
22. See supra note 12.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74
(1996) (affirming the application of Tennessee's community obscenity standards to material placed by
the defendant on an electronic bulletin board located in California but viewed in Tennessee).
24. But see Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HAsTNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 455, 454-
55 (1997) (warning that the self-rating of Internet sites presents free speech concerns and that self-
rating may be increased as PICS makes it easier to "create and market such ratings").
25. Industry was particularly interested in proposing nonregulatory responses to Senator Exon's
efforts promoting antipornography Internet legislation. PICS was developed by W3C, the World Wide
Web Consortium, co-chaired by James Miller of MIT and Paul Resnick of AT&T. See Pla(form for
558 [Vol. 76:553
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format for rating labels describing materials available on the Internet and
a standard mechanism for distributing those labels.26 As originally
conceived, parents or other supervisors could then set filtering rules that
would selectively block a child's access to materials associated with the
chosen rating labels, much like the way a parent might prohibit a child
from seeing an "R" rated movie.' In essence, the set of specifications
sought to empower parents with a means to screen out inappropriate mate-
rials for their children without hindering the dissemination to the child next
door or to anyone else.
The PICS standard itself is neutral with respect to the terms used in
rating labels, the actual rating of materials, and the filtering criteria. s
Multiple terms and rating labels may coexist for the same information. For
example, one set of ratings may use the terms "violence" and "nudity,"
while another set may adopt "blood" and "sex." Content providers can
rate their own material and distribute corresponding rating labels for the
information.29 Third parties may also associate rating labels with particu-
lar information disseminated over the Internet. 30  With the existence of
standardized labels, a supervisor, such as a parent, may then set criteria for
filtering, including which rating sources to use and which rating terns
indicate acceptable or inappropriate materials.31 Software mechanisms
built into web browsers or elsewhere in the network may accomplish this
filtering.32
Internet Content Selection (last modified July 18, 1997) <http:lwww.w3.orglPICS/>. For an
explanation of the technology and its development, see Paul Resnick & James Miller, PICS: Internet
Access Controls Without Censorship, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Oct. 1996, at 87, 87-93.
26. See Resnick & Miller, supra note 25, at 87.
27. See id. at 88.
28. See id. at 92.
29. This is the approach taken by RSACi and SafeSurfing. The respective groups have defined
distinct rating terms and content providers self-label according to those terms. See Recreational
Software Advisory Council on the Internet, About RSAC (visited Aug. 29, 1997)
<http://www.rsac.org/>; SafeSurf, The Original Internet Rating System (visited Aug. 29, 1997)
<http://www.safesurf.com/>; see also Weinberg, supra note 24, at 462-64 (comparing RSACi with
SafeSurfmg and noting the inherent limitations of self-rating). Self-labelling, however, runs the danger
that content providers may mislabel their materials. Dishonest labelling may be discouraged by legal
sanctions for deceptive behavior as well as possible marketplace retribution.
30. This is the approach taken by SurfWatch and Cyber Patrol. See Internet Cyber Patrol (last
modified Sept. 15, 1997) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com>; SurfWatch (visited Sept. 15, 1997)
< http://www.surfwatch.com/> (showing that both services rate the sites of third parties). Independent
labelling runs the risk that someone might distribute rating labels falsely purporting to come from
another. This practice is known as "spoofing." Cryptographic techniques can be used to detect and
deter such spoofs.
31. See Resnick & Miller, supra note 25, at 63. Microsoft's Internet Explorer 3.0, for example,
can read PICS labels from any source, whether self-labelled or third-party labelled, and allows users
to specify the filtering rules. See Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet, So. AM., Mar.
1997, at 62, 62.
32. See Resnick & Miller, supra note 25. Various techniques may also be deployed to make it
difficult for children or others to bypass the filters installed by parents or supervisors. See Internet
1998]
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The structure of PICS allows several different content-evaluation
standards to be applied to the same information on a web site and different
viewers to use different filter criteria.3 Thus, PICS can work well to
segment permissible content in various jurisdictions.' If laws conflict
between jurisdictions, network proxy servers can use PICS technology as
part of a firewall to filter content that is impermissible in the local
jurisdiction but legal elsewhere.' Similarly, if laws use potentially
incompatible standards such as the "local community standard" for porno-
graphy classifications,36 PICS technology allows different filters within a
single jurisdiction. This technology provides individual choice of filtering
rules, yet it still offers automatic enforcement. 7 Finally, PICS technol-
ogy can allow transborder enforcement by providing a means to label mate-
rial that is located elsewhere. Third-party rating labels may be distributed
through a server that is separate from the labelled documents. 8 Thus, the
document authors and web sites where the documents are posted need not
cooperate with law enforcement efforts.
B. Personal Information
1. The Policy Problem.-The fair treatment of personal information
in an Information Society poses another enormous challenge for legal
regulation. Over the last three decades, fair information practice principles
have been enshrined in industrialized societies.39 The penetration of
Cyber Patrol (last modified Sept. 15, 1997) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/> (noting the presence
of multiple safeguards that prevent users from disabling Cyber Patrol or renaming blocked materials).
33. See World Wide Web Consortium, PICS Statement of Principles (visited Aug. 29, 1997)
<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/principles.hml> (explaining how the standards devised by
PICS facilitate third-party labelling).
34. However, the platform will only be effective if there is a critical mass of labels and rated web
sites. See Weinberg, supra note 24. An incentive structure still needs to emerge that will encourage
the development of the critical mass. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure
Internet Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, LEX ELECrRONICA (forthcoming
1997 ), draft available in <http://home.sprynet.comreidenberg/picprv.htm> (discussing the critical-
mass problem for personal information).
35. This is the approach in Singapore and China. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12;
Minutes, supra note 12.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711, 710-11 (6th Cir.) (subjecting
pornographic, electronic materials to the community standards of "the geographic area where the
materials are sent"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
37. This is the basis for CyberPatrol or Microsoft Internet Explorer Content Advisor. See
Resnick, supra note 31 (noting that both services use the PICS standard).
38. See Resnick & Miller, supra note 25, at 89; Federal Trade Comm'n, Public Workshop on
Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure, F.T.C. Project P954807, Washington, DC
(June 4, 1996) (statement of Paul Resnick, AT&T Research) (transcript available at
<http://www.ftc.govlbcp/privacy/privacy.htm>) [hereinafter FTC Testimony].
39. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 6-13 (showing the emergence of rights in the
private and public sectors in the United States, but also demonstrating a more significant commitment
to the free flow of information); Symposium, supra note 9 (observing that fair information practices
have become law throughout Europe).
560
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  560 1997-1998
1998] Lex Informatica
information technology around the world during the last decade, however,
has provoked re-examination of the application of core fair information
practice principles in network environments.40 In the United States, legal
rights are limited, and public concern for privacy invasions is high.41
Public-policy debates continue to search for a consensus on privacy
standards. In Europe, comprehensive legal rights exist and government
enforcement plays an important role.42 At the same time, public-policy
debates throughout Europe reflect similar concerns for the development and
application of privacy standards to information circulating on global
networks.43 The widely ranging legal standards for fair information prac-
tice in different countries present conflicts for global information flows.'
40. See Privacy Working Group, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Privacy and the National
Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information (last modified June
6, 1995) <http:I/www.iitf.nist.govlipclipclipc-pubslniiprivprin fmal.html> (articulating basic princi-
ples for the "fair use of personal information" by users of the National Information Infrastructure);
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995) (recommending a re-evaluation of existing telecommunications laws
in light of the threat that information technology poses to privacy); European Privacy Directive, supra
note 9 (providing harmonized European Union standards for the privacy rights and free flow of
personal data); COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE Er DES LIBERTS [C.N.I.L.], VOIX,
IMAGE ET PROTECTION DES DONNtES PERSONNELLES (1996) (discussing the risks and applicability of
data protection principles to the digitalization of sound and images); International Working Group on
Data Protection in Telecommunications, Data Protection and Privacy on the Internet: Report and
Guidance (Nov. 19, 1996) <http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/diskus/13_15.htm> (recommending
increased privacy safeguards on the Internet).
41. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9, at 6-7 (recognizing the American commitment
to the free flow of information, the limited scope of existing legal rights, and the public concern over
privacy). Public opinion polls over the last decade consistently show that more than 75 % of Americans
feel as though they have lost control of their personal information. See, e.g., LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS.
& ALAN F. WESTIN, THE EQUIFAX REPORT ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE, at xxi (1990)
(reporting survey results indicating that 79% of Americans were either "somewhat" or "very" con-
cered about threats to their personal privacy); Humphrey Taylor, Opportunities and Minefields in
Interactive Services, PRIVACY & AM. BUS., Mar. 1995, at 9 (reporting that 76 % of the public believes
business asks for too much personal information); see also LouIs HARRIS & ASSOCS., EQUIFAX-HARRIS
CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 71 (1996) (reporting that 64% of Americans believe on-line service pro-
viders should not track users' Internet surfing habits).
42. See European Privacy Directive, supra note 9, at Art. I (requiring that all member states
protect their citizens' privacy); COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNrrED STATES 192 (1992) (describing the regulatory approaches
taken in Sweden, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
43. The European Commission has, for example, sponsored a comprehensive study of data
protection and on-line services to be completed by the end of 1997. See European Commission,
Invitation to tender No. XV/96/20/D. The French National Commission on Informatics and Freedom
has established a "Study Group on International Networks" composed of European data privacy
commissioners, seeCOMMISSION NATIONALE DEL'INFORMATIQUE Er DESLIBERTtS [C.N.I.L.], 17hPME
RAPPORT ANNUEL 65 (1997), and the Berlin Privacy Commission devoted much of the 21st Meeting
of the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications to Internet issues. See
International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Agenda for the 21st Meeting
of the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications in Paris (Mar. 20, 1997)
(on file with the Texas Law Review).
44. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to
Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137 (1992).HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  561 1997-1998
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Information flows defy national jurisdiction. European data protection
authorities have the legal right to interdict transborder data flows if the
destination does not have adequate standards for information privacy.45
However, the supervision of foreign data processing and the actual enforce-
ment of interdiction powers are extremely difficult to implement for trans-
national networks.'
2. Technical Solutions.-Several technical solutions provide valuable
tools to establish fair information practice policy on global networks. At
the first level, technological mechanisms can anonymize information that
would otherwise be associated with particular individuals. Identity
masks, such as anonymous remailers for electronic mail47 or anonymous
browsers" for Internet surfing, offer users control of their personal infor-
mation. One company, I/PRO, developed mapping features that enable
web sites to learn demographic and other information about site visitors
without those sites' discovering the identities of the individuals, unless an
individual affirmatively chooses to reveal personal information. 9 A user
reveals demographic information to a trusted third party, in this case
I/PRO. When the user connects to a web site, the user gives the web site
a numeric identifier. The web site then can gain access to some of the
demographic data from the trusted third party. If the user grants authoriza-
tion, the user's name and other personal information may be released to the
web site. These technical configurations allow information flows to avoid
problems with privacy issues because the technical configurations can re-
solve issues of conflicting privacy standards either with data that no longer
relates to specific individuals or with data that relates to identified persons
who have expressly agreed to particular use of their information. 50
45. See id. at S160-65 (discussing European policies on restricting transborder data flows); see
also European Privacy Directive, supra note 9, at Art. 25.
46. See C.N.I.L., supra note 40, at 1995.
47. An anonymous remailer is an Internet site that forwards mail to a specified address and masks
the identity of the original sender. See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, 1995 J.
ONLINE L. art. 4, 10 (Aug. 29, 1997) <http://www.law.comell.edu/jol/froomkin.htm> (explaining
that the common characteristic of all anonymous remailers is that they delete identifying information
on electronic mail and they replace the sender's name with that of the remailer or attach an anonymous
name tag).
48. While Internet surfing does not necessarily reveal any information about an individual other
than the Internet Protocol address for the particular surfing session, fully anonymous browsing may be
accomplished by directing all traffic through an anonymizing web site. See, e.g., Anonymizer.com
(visited Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www.anonymizer.com/open.htnl> (providing anonymous web
browsing through its anonymizer buffer).
49. See FTC Testimony, supra note 38 (statement of I/PRO). Although I/PRO has discontinued
this particular service, the technological concept remains valid. For configurations like I/PRO's,
however, aggregations of information must be carefully constructed to avoid the inadvertent disclosure
of identities. For example, the level of detail may indirectiy identify particular individuals when few
people could actually match the disclosed information.
50. If particular legal rules for data processing may not be waived by individuals, then technical
mechanisms that allow user choice may not be effective in reconciling conflicting policy rules.
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PICS-based rating labels and software filters similarly offer promise
for the resolution of conflicting legal privacy rules on the Internet."
Where legal standards differ, such as between the United States and most
European countries,' and where an individual may consent to deviations
from default legal standards, 3 filter configurations using the PICS
protocol allow users to make determinations about the use of personal
information and to assure the implementation of those decisions on the
Net.' Users may express their privacy preferences, and web sites may
be rated for their treatment of personal information. When the
preferences and treatment defaults do not match, a software filter can be
designed to disclose the discrepancy to the user and to stall the
transaction. 6  Users may choose either to proceed or to cancel the
interactionY The PICS-based model can also support explanations of
information practices by web sites to assist users in making their
decision."8 This vehicle can thus create disclosure-of-information
practices even in the absence of a legal requirement, and it can automate
the negotiation of information policies that are satisfactory to the user.
This automation of notice and choice permits customization of information
privacy to individual needs without imposing a time or information
processing burden on individuals.5 9
The PICS-based filters and configuration arrangements are not,
however, a complete solution. Unlike the context of PICS rating labels for
content, information privacy rating labels cannot readily be made without
51. For a description of PICS technology, see supra section Il(A)(2).
52. See generally SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 9 (comparing U.S. fair information
practices to European norms).
53. For example, there is a basic data privacy requirement in Europe that information only be used
to achieve the purpose for which it was collected. See id. at 14. Secondary uses of personal informa-
tion are permissible only with the consent of the individual concerned. See id. at 15. The default rule
limits the purposes of data use, and the legal rule allows individuals to waive those limitations.
54. See Reidenberg, supra note 34, Part IV (arguing that a PICS-based mechanism may be able
to satisfy the conflict between European and American privacy law); FTC Testimony, supra note 38,
at 96-99.
55. See FTC Testimony, supra note 38, at 96-97.
56. See id. at 98.
57. See id.
58. This application is technically feasible, but it is not yet built into the existing PICS standard.
See id. In April 1997, the World Wide Web Consortium launched a development effort to create a
negotiation protocol for privacy that provides for this functionality. See W3C, Platformfor Privacy
Preferences (P3P) Project: Platform for Privacy Preferences Initiative (visited Oct. 29, 1997)
<http://www.w3.org/P3/Overview.html>. P3P seeks to set up an interoperable way of expressing
privacy preferences by web sites and users. Users will be able to decide whether to accept the terms
of the web site before browsing.
59. Although the coexistence of multiple rating terms and preference choices may suggest a
confusing array of decisions for an individual, this downside of the PICS standard can be minimized
with competing default settings. For example, organizations such as the Direct Market Association
could make one set of rating terms and default preferences available to the public, just as Privacy
International, at the other end of the spectrum, could distribute rating terms and default settings.
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the cooperation of the web site.' The entity actually performing the data
processing must assist third-party labellers if the third parties are to
be able to assign appropriate ratings.6' Self-reported rating labels by
web sites do, however, offer a novel connection with legal rules. If
self-reported rating labels do not accurately reflect information practices,
nonprivacy legal claims may be created as a result, including potential
claims such as misrepresentation under tort law and breach of promise
under contract law. In either case, however, independent verification and
certification of rating labels will provide a vital element of confidence and
trust in the site's information practices.62 In addition, the efficacy of
PICS for information privacy depends on the emergence of rating
vocabularies' and a critical mass of sites with rating labels. If widely
acceptable rating terms do not exist and if few sites are given rating labels,
then PICS-based filters will not offer a very robust means of solving the
problem of conflicting information policy rules because the choice for
individuals would remain a theoretical possibility rather than a real,
automated process.
The possibility that PICS can facilitate transborder data flows in the
face of restrictions contained in the European Directive on data privacy
illustrates more specifically the value of technology as an instrument for
information policy.6' PICS technology can provide a means to assure
foreign regulatory agencies of the adequacy of off-shore standards of fair
information practice. If the private sector develops appropriate rating
terms based on accepted fair information practice principles and rating
labels are attributed to sites according to those terms, European data-pro-
tection authorities can be assured of technical rules that impose fair infor-
mation practices in the absence of law.'6 Filters using the PICS
protocol can read the rating labels and match site ratings to the user's
60. Web content can readily be observed and characterized by outside observers. The extent or
lack of fair treatment of personal information at a web site, however, will not be observable to an
outsider without access to the processing activities.
61. For a third party to be able to label accurately the information practices of a web site, the
outside observer will need access to the site's files and will need to conduct an audit of the processing
activities.
62. See Reidenberg, supra note 34, Part II; see also Internet Privacy Survey, PRIVACY & AM.
BUSINESS 7 (1997) (showing a lack of trust in business use of personal information on the Internet).
63. At least one set of labelling terms based on the Canadian Standards Association Model Code
of Fair Information Practices exists, as well as one based on the European Privacy Directive, supra
note 9. See FrC Testimony, supra note 38 (statement of Paul Resnick); Reidenberg, supra note 34,
at app.
64. See Reidenberg, supra note 34, Part IV.
65. European data protection commissions will still need to accept that the rating terms are
satisfactory. Under the European Directive, the rating terms can be approved as a form of a code of
conduct. See European Privacy Directive, supra note 9, at Art. 27 (encouraging the adoption of codes
of conduct to help implement the national provisions).
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preferences.' This electronic handshaking assures the user's consent to
the use of the personal information. In contrast to the difficult legal prob-
lems associated with enforcement of standards for extraterritorial data pro-
cessing, a PICS-based filtering system directly implements and enforces
fair information practices. "Certification agents" that verify the accuracy
of rating labels at the filtering stage can also achieve decentralized super-
vision of information practices. In other words, PICS allows configura-
tions that include rating labels and certifications of those labels before web
browsing software makes the connection to the web site for an interactive
session.67 If the private sector does not develop these mechanisms,
European data protection regulators could encourage the implementation of
PICS technology. Rather than prohibit transborder data flows because of
uncertain information policies, regulators would be able to require rating
labels by particular entities based on specific rating terms and would be
able to accredit "certifying agents" so that supervision would be
assured.6" In other words, through the application of PICS technology
European data protection agencies may identify as well as create a subset
of locations outside the European Union that assure "adequate" protection
in the absence of a legal regime.
C. Ownership Rights
1. The Policy Issue.-Beyond a few possible solutions for content and
information privacy policies, technology also presents a valuable response
to some of the legal-policy problems associated with the management of
intellectual property rights. Application of the existing intellectual property
regimes of copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret to the electronic
world reveals problems similar to those found in the regulation of both
content and information privacy. Intellectual property rights are territorial
and the scope of national rights remains to a certain degree uncertain for
digital works.69  For example, the treatment of file caching under
66. To satisfy the European Directive's "adequacy" standard, European data protection commis-
sions may stipulate to the use of a default set of preferences for the filtering process. See Reidenberg,
supra note 34, Part IV.
67. The use of a "trusted" system can also preclude the exchange of any information to the
destination site prior to the negotiation of the treatment of personal information. See generally Mark
Stefik, Trusted Systems, Sci. AM., Mar. 1997, at 78-81 (discussing trusted systems and the challenge-
response technique).
68. In essence, this means that the European Union might be able to avoid confrontation with
foreign countries over the legal standards in the foreign country. The European Union can define a
set of PICS compliant rating terms, approve a set of preferences for those rating terms that meet the
"adequacy" standard, and accredit auditors to certify the accuracy of rating labels. Trusted servers
filtering European approved preferences against rating labels certified by the accredited auditors provide
assurance that "adequacy" is satisfied. The pronouncement by European data protection commissioners
on rating terms, preferences, and auditor accreditation is both politically and practically easier than
selectively judging foreign law. See Reidenberg, supra note 34 (discussing accrediting rating terms).
69. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing the needs for and problems with
international intellectual property coordination and protection). Various foreign government reports
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intellectual property laws may be a noninfringing use of the underlying
protected work or may be an unauthorized copying; 0 the answer is
unlikely to be uniform across national borders. In addition, works that are
globally distributed or accessed internationally on networks face serious
impediments to the enforcement of legal protection.7  Digital multimedia
works highlight the difficulties of .protecting intellectual property in
network environments.' The works can be manipulated, changed, or
retransmitted by the recipient, often with little possibility of the owner's
discovery. 3  Finding infringements and enforcing rights in distant
locations is not easy. Even if these scope and enforcement problems were
resolved, that technological developments outpace the rate of legal change
poses another particular problem for intellectual property rights; the law
always lags behind the technology.
2. The Technical Response.-In this context, technical solutions also
become an instrument for the management of intellectual property rights
and offer some policy solutions.7' Technical standards can enable intel-
lectual property producers to choose the type of protection they want. For
example, technical copy protection can reverse the copyright law's fair use
doctrine. If software is distributed in a copy protected form, the acquirer
will not be able to make backup copies even though the law may permit
identify similar problems. See European Comm'n, Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in
the Information Society, reprinted in 43 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 53-54 (1995) (arguing that European
intellectual property rights need to be enhanced and harmonized for the digital environment); Preparing
Canada for a Digital World: Final Report of the Information Highway Advisory Council, Ch. 5 (visited
Sept. 9,1996) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ihOl643e.html> (Canadian report) (emphasizing the need
to ensure that intellectual property-right protections continue to be adequate in a digital age); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Consequences of Differences in Scope of Copyright Protection on an International
Scale, Proceedings of "Information, National Policy and the Information Infrastructure," John F.
Kennedy School of Government/Harvard Law School (Jan. 28-30, 1996), available in
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/>.
70. See Cyberspace Law Institute, Copyright Law on the Internet: The Special Problem of Caching
and Copyright Protection (visited Aug. 29, 1997 ) <http://www.cli.orglCaching.htnl> (arguing that
the subtleties should distinguish protected and nonprotected cache copying).
71. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 130-55 (articulating the challenges facing policymakers
as they attempt to protect intellectual property rights in materials that are distributed electronically over
international networks).
72. For an overview of the problem, see generally the excellent collection of papers contained in
THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT ( P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (discussing
the applicability of copyright regimes to information on the Internet).
73. Netscape 3.01, for example, allows a user to save another person's web page-including
images-and then manipulate or modify both the text and image in an editor mode. See Navigator Gold
Authoring Guide (visited Nov. 15, 1997) <http://home.netscape.com/eng/
mozilla/3.0/handbook/authoring/navgold.htm> ;cf. Cohen, supra note 10, at 985 (discussing copyright
owners' desire to prevent unauthorized reproduction by developing copyright management systems that
track manipulations of digital works).
74. See, e.g., Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine Is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139, 143-44 (1996) (discussing technical protections as a
means to control the use of electronic documents).HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  566 1997-1998
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it."5  The technology prevents the acquirer of the software to make
duplications by establishing a read-only format; the law, in contrast, may
have adopted a default rule permitting certain copying.7 6  Technical
mechanisms will also allow information policies such as web file caching
to become negotiable.' Web caching occurs when world wide web pages
on remote servers that are visited by users are copied into the user's local
memory. Internet sites or browser software, like Microsoft Explorer or
Netscape Navigator, typically perform web caching for quick and easy
repeat access or manipulation.7" The provider of the original web page
does not presently participate in the caching decisions; the visitor's system
determines when to save a copy in a cache. Technical architectures such
as labelling and the interposition of middleware, however, can offer
capabilities for web sites to refuse remote system caching. 9  Labelling
web pages in the transmission protocol can allow web-page developers to
express their rules for dissemination of the page. s° Proxies or inter-
mediaries that sit between the transmission and the user's system could then
read the affixed labels and either allow the caching or require that access
to the page pass through a secure viewing mechanism that does not permit
transfers of accessed information." These capabilities allow for self-
enforcement of the choices desired by owners of intellectual property.
Copy protection also employs self-executing protection analogous to the
proxy or intermediary option for the customization of file caching.
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994) (allowing copying of a copyrighted computerprogram forarchival
purposes). Surprisingly, the United States government has argued for criminal penalties against those
trying to circumvent technical protections that might discourage even lawful copying. See WHrrE
PAPER, supra note 10, at 230 (recommending that the Copyright Act prohibit mechanisms that defeat
technical protections even if such circumvention might constitute permissible "fair use"). Professor
Cohen has argued persuasively, however, that legal mechanisms criminalizing tampering with technical
protections may be unconstitutional if applied to prevent an individual from viewing information
anonymously. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 1019-31. Nevertheless, such a constitutional restriction
would only shorten the time window for commercial exploitation because the electronic lock is bound
to be picked, eventually rendering the information insecure.
76. See, e.g., Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a defendant's copying of the plaintiff's software with the mere purpose of studying the functional
requirements of compatibility was a "legitimate, nonexploitive purpose" that did not violate the
copyright laws).
77. See generally Rohit Khare & Joseph Reagle, Rights Management, Copy Detection, andAccess
Control (Proceedings of NRC/CSTB/Information Systems Trustworthiness Project) (visited Sept. 21,
1997) <http://www.w3.org/IPR/work/NRC-vl.htm > (describing the possibility ofmeta-data formats
that would allow intellectual-property-rights negotiation).
78. For example, Netscape Navigator 3.01 typically stores web pages from visited sites in the
Netscape directory within a subdirectory named "cache." The size of the cache file may be specified
by the user through network preferences in the options menu. See How Does Document Caching Work
in Netscape Navigator? (last modified May 24, 1996) <http://help.netscape.com/kb/clientl
960514-44.html >.
79. See Khare & Reagle, supra note 77, §§ 2.1.1, 2.3.2.
80. See id. §§ 2.1.2, 2.3.1.
81. See id. § 2.3.2. HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  567 1997-1998
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Similarly, technical solutions can enable network-based enforcement of
other intellectual property rights. Technical systems can automate permis-
sions and payment for use of protected works.' Secure viewers may be
implemented to assure that an owner's choice of restrictions are self-
executing.' Alternatively, trusted systems may be used to enforce a
property owner's rules on a computer that is outside the actual control of
the property owner.' The trusted system acts as an intermediary between
the property owner and user to assure that conditions for use and access are
respected.' In effect, technology provides network-based instruments
that enable owners to manage intellectual property in ways that legal
regulation finds problematic.
Ill. Network Technology as a Distinct Source of Information Flow
Rule-Making: Distinguishing Lex Informatica from Legal Rules
The technical responses and solutions to policy conflicts show new
ways to establish information flow rules. Policymakers typically, though,
associate rule-making with the elaboration of law through the political pro-
cess within and among states. Rules established in this fashion form a
legal regulatory regime. In the context of information flows on networks,
the technical solutions begin to illustrate that network technology itself
imposes rules for the access to and use of information. Technological
architectures may prohibit certain actions on the network, such as access
without security clearances, or may impose certain flows, such as manda-
tory address routing data for electronic messages. Technology may also
offer policymakers a choice of information flow rules through configuration
decisions. In effect, this set of impositions on information flows through
technological defaults and system configurations offers two types of sub-
stantive rules: immutable policies embedded in the technology standards
that cannot be altered and flexible policies embedded in the technical
architecture that allow variations on default settings. Lex Informatica has
a number of distinguishing features that are analogous to a legal regulatory
82. The Copyright Clearance Center is, for example, beginning to use an on-line clearing system
for granting permissions for the use of copyrighted works and for collecting royalty payment. See,
e.g., CCCStatementofMission(visited Oct. 7,1997) < http://www.copyright.com/cccframes.html >.
Legal mechanisms for tracking access to on-line works may, however, pose significant constitutional
hurdles. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 1024-30 (discussing how the government's interest in
antitampering mechanisms may violate the First Amendment).
83. A secure viewer acts as a sort of "embassy on the Net." It enables "extraterritorial"
enforcement of a data provider's access restrictions. Data is distributed encrypted and can only be
accessed or managed through the secure viewer controlled by the information distributor. This is
known as a "trusted system." See generally Stefik, supra note 67 (explaining the technologies of
secure access and trusted systems).
84. See id. at 81.
85. For example, a file downloaded in Adobe PDF format and read using Acroread.exe cannot
be printed. Folio Views software similarly allows the owner to specify user permissions.
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regime and support its role as an important system of rules for an Informa-
tion Society. In essence, policy choices are available either through
technology itself, through laws that cause technology to exclude possible
options, or through laws that cause users to restrict certain actions.'
Specific information policy technologies that set information flow rules
show the significance of Lex Informatica as a parallel rule system.
A. Features of Lex Informatica
Table 1-Rule Regimes
Legal Regulation J Lex Informatica
Framework Law Architecture
standards





Customized Rules Contract Configuration







Primary Enforcement Court Automated, Self-
execution
As illustrated in Table 1, Lex Informatica has analogs for the key
elements of a legal regime. The basic building block or framework for
86. Professor Lessig has argued a similar point from the perspective of interpreting the United
States Constitution for cyberspace. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 871 (discussing the traditional legal
and technological constraints on state regulatory power).
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legal regulation is law. For Lex Informatica, architectural standards are
an analogous set of building blocks. Architectural standards such as
HTTP 7 define the basic structure and defaults of information flows on
a communications network. Jurisdictionally, the legal regime and Lex
Informatica provide overlapping rule systems. Jurisdiction for legal
regulation is primarily based on territory. Legal rules apply only in a well-
defined place where the sovereign can exert its power.88 In contrast, the
jurisdictional lines for Lex Informatica do not depend on territorial borders.
Instead, the jurisdiction of Lex Informatica is the network itself because the
default rules apply to information flows in network spheres rather than
physical places. Legal rules, consequently, can apply to each con-
stituent part of the network that is located in a particular physical
jurisdiction.
The substantive content of the rules in a legal regime derives
from statutory language, government interpretation, and court decisions.
Lex Informatica also contains substantive content defined through techni-
cal capabilities and customary practices. For example, the protocol for
sending electronic mail, SMTP,'9 sets a substantive policy default rule for
the circulation of identifying information which is an immutable rule of
communications transmission. The standard message format contains a
required data field labelled "FROM" to identify the sender, and the cus-
tomary practice of electronic mail servers establishes that the data in the
"FROM" field pertains to the actual person sending the message. 90
Similarly, digital telecommunications signaling capabilities establish a
default policy rule for the circulation of caller information.9 This
rule allows flexibility and customization of the information flow.
Compared to earlier analog switches, digital signaling provides more
options for the stream of transaction information. With digital signaling,
call identification information may be transmitted or blocked, and unidenti-
fied calls may be rejected by recipients. Actual practices give great control
to network users.' Thus, these technological capabilities and practices
set default rules for the circulation of all information.
87. HTTP is an acronym for "Hypertext Transfer Protocol," which is the transmission structure
for exchanging information on the World Wide Web. See RICHARD W. WIGGINS, THE INTERNET FOR
EVERYONE 268 (1995).
88. See RESATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
89. SMTP is an acronym for the "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol." See JOHN R. LEVINE &
CAROL BAROUDI, THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIES 69 (1993).
90. Nevertheless, anonymous or forged senders are also technically possible and illustrate the case
of a deviation from the customary default expectation. This immutable rule may thus be bypassed with
the customization of information policy for the particular message.
91. See Reidenberg, Rules of the Road, supra note 5, at 300 n.53.
92. See Glen Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional To Give It Out?):
Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REV. 145, 149
(1989) (describing the technology and services available).
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The source of default rules for a legal regime is typically the state.
The political-governance process ordinarily establishes the substantive law
of the land. For Lex Informatica, however, the primary source of default
rule-making is the technology developer and the social process by which
customary uses evolve. 3  Technologists design the basic infrastructure
features that create and implement information policy defaults. Although
states may influence the decisions made by technologists through legal
restraints on policy choices,' the technologists otherwise "enact" or make
the technical standards, and the users adopt precise interpretations through
practices.
In the legal regulatory regime, private contractual arrangements can
be used both to deviate from the law's default rules and to customize the
relationship between the parties. 95 Such deviations are only available if
the law permits freedom of contract and does not preclude the participants'
actions; circumstances exist in which the law may not permit
customization. 9 For example, public policy generally rejects contractual
waivers of liability for intentional or reckless harms inflicted on others.'
Like a legal regime, Lex Informatica offers both customization of rules and
inalienable rules. Customization for Lex Informatica occurs through tech-
nological configurations. For example, Internet browsers such as Netscape
contain log files that record the user's web traffic patterns. 9 This proto-
col establishes a default rule for the collection of personal data that a user
can override by altering file attributes or by disabling the log feature. 99
As with legal regulation, these customizations through reconfigurations are
only possible if the architectural standards support the deviations. In the
93. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 897 ("With respect to the architecture of cyberspace, and the
worlds it allows, we are God.").
94. See infra section V(B)(2).
95. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (observing that parties are sometimes free to contract
around the default rules); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 824 (1992) (analogizing default rules to word-processing programs that
set margins in the absence of the user expressly changing the setting).
96. See E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.2, at 353 (2d ed. 1990) (providing examples of
agreements that courts will not enforce because they contravene public policy).
97. See id.
98. See Netscape Communications Corp., Persistent Client State HTTP Cookies (visited Aug. 29,
1997 ) < http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie._spec.html > (explaining thatcookiescanbeused
to store information about a user on the user's computer, which is then accessed by the server visited
on subsequent visits).
99. The data storage files may be attributed "Read-only" status, which prevents the Netscape from
recording the information on the hard drive. For example, a user of Windows 95 may do this using
the Windows Explorer Software packaged with Windows 95. At the File Menu, Properties Sub-menu,
General Tab, and Attributes Selection, the user may impose "Read-only" attributes on the selected file.
Netscape Version 3.0 offers users the option to disable the log file, but neither informs of nor explains
the existence of "cookies" tracking.
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case of log files for Internet use, reconfigurations can only be effective if
the logging feature is designed to collect and store the data on a user's
local disk drive. If the information is collected and stored directly by the
Internet service provider, the user will not have the capability to override
the default rule. Lex Informatica can thus have substantive inalienable
rules as a result of architectural decisions.
The customization process shows a number of significant differences
between the legal regime and Lex Informatica. Law allows customization
either through high cost, individualized contract negotiations, or through
the moderate-cost use of standardized forms. 100 Lex Informatica offers
a wider range of options. Off-the-shelf configurations, like those contained
in software packages bundled with equipment, are a relatively low-cost
customization of rules. 10 1 Manufacturers determine these configurations
or customizations, such as the routine packaging of Windows 95 with
Texas Instrument laptop computers." z  User installable configurations,
such as printer fonts, are a slightly more expensive method of
customization. 13 Users must invest time and effort for the selection and
installation of the configuration, but these are nevertheless available. And,
analogous to the costly negotiation process for contractual arrangements,
users may individually select configurations to achieve rule customization.
For example, users may deviate from the default configuration by selecting
customized color schemes for the appearance of the Windows operating
system. 104
Finally, Lex Informatica has distinct enforcement properties. Legal
regulation depends primarily on judicial authorities for rule enforcement.
Rule violations are pursued on an ey post basis before the courts., 5
Lex Informatica, however, allows for automated and self-executing rule
enforcement."°  Technological standards may be designed to prevent
actions from taking place without the proper permissions or authority. 7
100. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 90-92.
101. For example, the Internet Wizard on Windows 95 contains a pre-programmed set of
configurations for the use of Internet Explorer and the MSN network.
102. For example, the Texas Instruments Extensa 650CDT sold in December 1996 gave the buyer
a one-time choice of a Windows 95 installation or a Windows for Workgroups installation. See Texas
Instruments, Notebook Product Information-Extensa 650CDT Notebook (visited Mar. 28, 1997)
<http://www.ti.com/notebook/docs/ext650t.htm> .
103. These configurations require an investment of time and skill by users.
104. The display options in Windows 95 allow users to choose alternate color patterns or to
custom design their own if they wish to spend the time and effort.
105. Lawsuits to enforce rules ordinarily occur after the alleged violation has taken place. See,
e.g., EDWARD YoRio, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 1.2.2,
at 8-9 (1989). Injunctions to prevent violations ex ante are still enforced by expost contempt actions.
Id. § 4.5.2, at 96.
106. Technology may, however, prevent an action that violates the rule from occurring at all.
107. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 896 (noting that software code can control access to information).
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For example, PolicyMaker, a cryptographically based trust management
mechanism, illustrates this attribute. 108 PolicyMaker is a language for
sophisticated trust management that can certify permissions for both users
and actions."° PolicyMaker will block the execution of transactions if
credentials are not appropriately verified. PolicyMaker checks the authen-
ticity of a cryptographic key (usually that of a particular person) and,
before allowing the transaction to proceed, verifies that the keyholder
meets a set of criteria required for the transaction. 0  For instance,
PolicyMaker can check the validity of a password for an electronic pay-
ment order and verify that the password is held by a corporate officer
entitled to issue such payment orders."' If either the password is
fraudulent or the holder does not have the rank permitting payment orders,
PolicyMaker blocks execution. This cc ante enforcement is implemented
automatically using information processing capabilities.
B. Setting Information Flow Rules with Technology
Table 2-Policy Rules and Technologies
Information Default Customization Policy
Flows Technology
Content Public Private Cryptography
Transmission
Identified Anonymous Remailers
Payment Identified Anonymous E-cash
Transaction
Web Surfing Anonymous Identified Web Browser
Identified Anonymous Masking Sites
Information Unrestricted Pre-screened PICS Label
Distribution Filters
108. See Matt Blaze et al., Decentralized Trust Management, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (Oakland, Cal.) (May 1996).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. PolicyMaker, in this example, would authenticate the password of the corporate officer and
verify that the officer was authorized to issue a payment order for the amount required by the
transaction.
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As demonstrated in Table 2, technologies designed expressly for
information policy already exist and demonstrate the capabilities and
existence of flexible as well as immutable substantive rule features of Lex
Informatica. Technologists have specifically designed "privacy enhancing
technologies""' 2 to customized particular information flow rules. In
addition, new policy technologies are under development or are available
to facilitate the customized management of information rights in the face
of existing technological default rules.
Privacy-enhancing technologies focus on the preservation of confiden-
tiality in the transmission of messages. Many networks, like the Internet,
have architectural designs and standards that implement the default rule of
open information access. Public key cryptography is a classic example of
a privacy-enhancing technology. This technology allows the contents of
*information to be secured against unauthorized access."' Because most
network architectural designs do not preclude cryptography, network
participants can use it to engage in private communications. Cryptographic
choices override the default rule of public disclosure and form a custom-
ized rule for the particular users. This customized system configuration
may be accomplished by off-the-shelf products such as PGP and RSA or
by user-created mechanisms." 4 In any case, once the user chooses to
encrypt information, the privacy protection applies throughout the network
and is self-executing-ordinarily, only recipients with the' proper keys will
have access." 5
Technologies of anonymity also exist to establish network privacy
rules for message transmission, electronic transactions, and Internet web
surfing."6 Where network architecture and technical capabilities set the
identification of users as a default mandatory transmission rule, participants
may nevertheless desire to interact anonymously. Network architecture
allows technologies of anonymity to override the standard practice of
linking particular senders to messages and thus allows flexibility within the
substantive rules governing information flows. For example, electronic
112. This terminology has been adopted by several government agencies. See INFORMATION AND
PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ONTARIO, CANADA & REGISrRATIEKAMER, THE NETHERLANDS PRIVACY-
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: THE PATH TO ANONYMITY (1995).
113. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY
IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 113 (1994) [hereinafter INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY]. Public
Key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptosystems, involves two keys: the first to encrypt and a second
related key to decrypt. The first of the two keys is publicly distributed, but the second remains private
and assures that only the keyholder can decrypt. See id. at 38-39.
114. See id. at 39. Users may also define their own cryptographic algorithm such as a simple
code name to replace an actual identity or a complicated mathematical formula to cipher text. These
may be more expensive than existing products.
115. This is not to say that cryptography is fail-safe. If the encryption algorithm is weak or if the
keys are not safely stored, unauthorized access to the information may still take place.
116. See generally Froomkin, supra note 47.
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mail messages may be routed through anonymous remailers to mask the
identity of the message sender,1 7 electronic payment transactions may
similarly be structured to anonymize the payor,"8 and even anonymous
credit cards can be created through communications networking
techniques." 9 These configurations offer customized rules which deviate
from the network norm. Like confidentiality technologies, those of ano-
nymity may be used from off-the-shelf configurations or from more elabo-
rately designed arrangements. For example, Internet surfers have a certain
degree of "off-the-shelf' anonymity when they visit web sites because only
the Server Internet Protocol address" is revealed to the site hosting the
web page, not the individual user's name.' This level of anonymity is,
nevertheless, often by-passed by browsers that are configured to reveal user
identities.' Alternatively, web surfers may choose to surf through
several layers of anonymizing sites to assure greater anonymity.TI One
of the Lex Informatica features of these technologies of anonymity is
that they operate throughout the network. Anonymization may occur
automatically, providing ex ante enforcement.
The development of "policy technologies" for information distribution
also illustrates the rule-making features of Lex Informatica. These tech-
nologies create network-based rules which enhance the access, distribution,
and use of information. The basic architecture of the Internet, for
example, embodies the default rule of unrestricted information distribution.
The PICS technical standard 4 creates a mechanism for pre-screening or
modifying the default rule. The Internet architecture allows rating terms
and rating labels based on the PICS format to be included in data
117. See Andre Bacard, Anonymous Remaiter FAQ (last modified Mar. 27, 1995)
<http://www.paranoia.comdrugs/kef/remailer-faq.htmi> ;see also Ralph Levien, Remailer List (last
modified Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-raphremailer-list.html> (listing of
anonymous re-mailers). A similar technique may be used for anonymous web surfing. See Your
Anonymized Surf Starts Here (visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.anonymizer.com/open.html>.
118. See Froomkin, supra note 47, at 41.
119. See, e.g., Steven H. Low & Nicholas F. Maxemchuk, Anonymous Credit Cards, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
(Fairfax, Va.) (Nov. 2-4, 1994).
120. The Internet Protocol (IP) address is a numeric address that identifies the message server
rather than the individual user. IP addresses may also be assigned domain names such as
"law.fordham.edu" for easy user recognition. For many users accessing the Internet from an Internet
service provider such as America Online or CompuServe, the IP address will be different each time
the user logs onto the Internet. This dynamic IP address provides a further degree of anonymity.
121. There may, however, be instances when an IP address or domain name corresponds to an
individual user and thus more completely reveals identity.
122. Netscape Navigator, for example, reveals the user's identity to web sites if the user has
entered the information to the Netscape program.
123. Technological configurations can also be constructed to give the benefits of anonymity to
users and the value of personal information to web sites.
124. For a general description of the PICS technology, see supra section ll(A)(2).
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transmissions throughout the network."as This technical capability
enables individual network participants to set customized rules through
filters for the type of information that each participant may receive, rather
than forcing a unique restriction on the type of information disseminated
throughout the network; and either "off-the-shelf" customizations or
intensively designed policies can accomplish this rule-setting. For
example, a parent-teacher association may distribute computer disks with
suggested filters preconfigured, or parents may tailor their choice of rating
terms and screening to their children and their family values.126
Similarly, the creation and distribution of rating terms and rating
labels for the fair information practices of web sites allows users to set
filters to warn of particular practices before disclosing personal
information."z  Combining PICS rating terms and rating labels with
filtering software gives users the ability to judge others' use of personal
information, customizing the network default policy of total web site
control. In essence, filtering provides assurance that a user's information
policy matches the policy at a remote site. 1" The PICS-based examples
also illustrate the self-executing nature of Lex Informatica. The filtering-
software technology performs the permission check prior to displaying
content on the user's screen or warns the user of remote-site privacy
standards in advance of certain information disclosures. 29
IV. Applying Lex Informatica
The substantive norms and flexibility of Lex Informatica provide new
and useful public-policy tools. Networks challenge traditional legal means
to establish ground rules for information access and use. Global access and
communications pose extraordinarily difficult jurisdictional dilemmas and
choice of law problems.130  Any particular activity may be subject to
125. See FTC Testimony, supra note 38 (statement of Paul Resnick, AT&T Research).
126. CyberPatrol, for example, offers off-the-shelf screening. See Microsystems Software,
Welcome to Cyberpatrol (visited Sept. 19, 1997) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/> ;see also Weinberg,
supra note 24, at 454-55 (noting that, although a common language for Internet rating systems makes
it easier to create ratings and therefore easier for parents to block access, there are drawbacks).
127. Such a label-and-filter mechanism employs the paradigm established by PICS for content-
access control. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
128. Additional infrastructure mechanisms, such as independent certification of rating labels, are
prerequisites to effective participation by the user in actual information practices. See Reidenberg,
supra note 34.
129. In the case of information privacy, some transaction information will be received by the host
web site in order to implement the PICS-based customization. Nonetheless, the use of trusted third-
party sites may be used to assure anonymity of this information. See Reidenberg, supra note 34, Part
ll.
130. Network actors and activities may be difficult to localize, thus challenging concepts of in
personam jurisdiction and applicable law. See generally Burk, supra note 3 (discussing the juris-
dictional problem in the context of United States law); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
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varying national legal standards, and the decentralization of networks
creates opportunities to circumvent national laws and evade state enforce-
ment powers. Alternatively, decentralization may impose the most restric-
tive laws on all global activities. At the same time, harmonization of legal
standards is not a realistic solution for global information issues.' A
legal regulatory regime lacks an important degree of flexibility that the
Information Society requires. 32  By contrast, Lex Informatica has a
series of valuable characteristics that may flexibly advance information
policy goals. The formulation of customized Lex Informatica rules may,
to an important degree, avoid many significant difficulties inherent in legal
solutions, such as conflict and uncertainty. For example, Lex Informatica
offers a new means to deal with the difficult problems that the legal regime
faces with Internet content regulation, circulation and abuse of personal
information, and preservation of intellectual property interests on global
networks.
A. Advantages of Lex Informatica
Lex Informatica has three sets of characteristics that are particularly
valuable for establishing information policy and rule-making in an
Information Society. First, technological rules do not rely on national
borders. 33 Second, Lex Informatica allows easy customization of rules
with a variety of technical mechanisms."' Finally, technological rules
may also benefit from built-in self-enforcement and compliance-monitoring
capabilities.
1. JurisdictionalAdvantages.-The Information Society poses impor-
tant jurisdictional issues. Network activities may take place on a
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (distinguishing Cyberspace
regulation from other areas of law that are geographically based and arguing that Cyberspace has its
own jurisdiction); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995: A Year in
Review, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 181 (1996) (discussing the complexities of court decisions in the choice-
of-law area).
131. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations illustrated the difficulty of coordinating
international regulation. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). The negotiations took eight years to complete
and still did not resolve thorny issues for international services. Similarly, the TRIPS accord, a major
achievement regarding intellectual property that emerged from the Uruguay Round, does not address
key questions of the scope of protection for intellectual property. See Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
132. The Information Society has dynamic and complex characteristics that are at odds with
standard regulatory approaches. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 926-30.
133. See Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 917 (suggesting that national borders are being replaced by
network borders).
134. See infra section IV(A)(2).
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transnational basis. For the legal regime, various national authorities and
policymakers may make legitimate claims to regulate users and information
flows. 35 However, the very nature of network behavior makes these
claims subject to complex choice of law decisions. States are generally
reluctant to impose their laws on activities taking place in foreign
jurisdictions. 36  Consequently, jurisdiction becomes a critical threshold
obstacle to sensible information policymaking.
In contrast, the jurisdiction of Lex Informatica is the network itself.
Technologically implemented rules apply throughout the relevant network.
As such, Lex Informatica reaches across borders and does not face the
same jurisdictional, choice of law problem that legal regimes encounter
when networks cross territorial or state jurisdictional lines. Lex
Informatica faces conflict of rules at the gateways between networks. If
technological standards on both sides of the gateway are interoperable,
information flows can cross the gateway without difficulty. When the
standards are not compatible, the flows will be impeded by the difference
in technical specifications. For example, software modules written for one
computer operating system cannot usually function on another operating
system. However, the legal regime's choice of law problem forces a
selection of one governing law, while both sets of technical rules may be
applicable through the use of translations and conversions. In the example
of operating systems, software programs exist to translate standards
between computer operating systems.'37 This duality feature allows
flexibility in accommodating many information policy rule choices
simultaneously.
Technical rule formulations for information access may also avoid the
risk of liability imposed by conflicting legal rules and may offer solutions
for the problem of self-censorship that conflicting content regulation
encourages. Policy technologies offer substantive rules in Lex Informatica
that shift the issue from censorship, or blocking distribution, to filtering the
reception of information. 38  This shift allows different rules to apply to
different recipients. Policy decisions about information reception can be
made at various levels. Recipients themselves can have the power to make
135. The state where access or use occurs, the state where processing takes place, or the state
where the server is located may all try to claim jurisdiction.
136. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating
that United States copyright law cannot generally be applied abroad); Burk, supra note 3, at 1107-32
(recognizing the due process and dormant Commerce Clause limitations on states' ability to regulate
activities outside their borders).
137. See ComputerAssocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing
the program in controversy as an "operating system compatibility component" that'translates between
operating systems).
138. See supra section II(A)(2) (describing PICS filtering technology).
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informed decisions about information content. 3 9 A particular computer
may be configured with its own filtering rule. A local area network may
have a network-wide policy rule, while an information service provider
may adopt a particular rule system-wide. All ISPs in a given country may
even have the same filter policy. This flexibility and emphasis on recep-
tion means that a unique rule is unnecessary for global distribution of
information because distributors in one jurisdiction need not contravene the
norms of another jurisdiction.
2. Customization Advantages.-Flexibility and customization of
information policy are critical for an Information Society. Because
activities conducted on global networks may be transnational, network
participants need certainty in the rules applicable to their relationships
and need to accommodate potentially varying national laws. Legal regimes
typically allow for these objectives to be met through freedom of
contract. " However, freedom of contract is neither absolute nor always
an efficient means to deal with network issues. Public-order rights may not
be waivable,' 4' and the negotiation process for developing an appropriate
international contract will either be complex or unlikely to give any choice
to individual participants. 42
Lex Informatica allows customized rules to suit particular network
situations and preserve choices for individual participants.143 Lex
Informatica can provide for this flexibility and customization through the
adoption of technological standards and configurations that may tailor rules
to the precise circumstances or that may empower individual participants
to make their own decisions. System-wide configurations may be specified
to follow different rules in different national jurisdictions. For example,
automatic data purges may be set for European data to comply with data
139. See supra section II(A)(2).
140. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 96, § 1.7, at 20-24 (discussing freedom of contract as a
historical way of promoting economic activity in the United States).
141. See id. § 5.1, at 345-50 (listing reasons why courts will sometimes refuse to enforce contracts
based on public policy grounds).
142. On-line service provider contracts, for example, are presented to users on a take-it or leave-it
basis. As providers adopt standardized contracts for transnational services, users will encounter fewer
choices in their "freedom to contract." Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS
J. 311, 321 (1995) (noting that uniform contracts for on-line services would not allow bargaining).
143. Arguably, this advantage may be mitigated by pressures for product standardization that
would reduce the desirability of extensive choices. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the
Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1041, 1043-54 (1996) (suggesting that network
externalities, the advantages of compatibility, and resource commitments all push the Internet toward
standardization). However, Lex Informatica customization does not refute product standardization.
Lex Informatica customization only requires that the underlying base standard not preclude configura-
tion choices. The desirable product standardization would take the form of default configurations that
might nevertheless be modified.
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privacy laws"' but not set in parts of the network where laws do not
require it. Alternatively, technological choices may be made to give
individuals various configuration options such as PICS-based content
screening."s Similarly, technological standards may be used to custom-
ize rules for transnetwork differences. Protocols exist, for example, to
connect on-line service providers such as America Online (AOL) to the
Internet." At the same time, technical choices may be developed to
accommodate differences in network and national information policy rules.
If rules for content evolve differently in various states, users may receive
differentiated access."47 Lex Informatica offers a panoply of opportuni-
ties in configuration choice and frequently allows users to override standard
system configurations.
Lex Informatica is also distinct from legal regulation because
its mechanisms may implement customizations with minimal effort.
Technological "filters," for example, assure that a particular rule is applied
to information wherever the information goes. Security filters are a
paradigmatic illustration such as the use of passwords to access data no
matter where the user or data are located. Similarly, technological
"translators" provide a significant mechanism to facilitate customization.
Translation converts either a rule or a data set from one system to another
for execution. For example, one set of PICS content rating labels may be
translated into another group's rating scheme." Other translation
mechanisms include anonymization of data, use of an anonymous remailer,
or encryption-decryption operations.
3. Enforcement Advantages.-For the legal regime, the enforcement
capability of rights-holders or states is a serious issue. Legal regulation
relies on ex post actions against rule violators. However, because of the
fluid and global nature of network activities, rule violators will increasingly
be difficult to identify, find, and ultimately prosecute. Self-help measures
may be available for private parties, such as requiring security bonds or
full payment in advance of service or delivery, but these measures can be
cumbersome and risky.
144. See European Privacy Directive, supra note 9, at Art. 6 (establishing a limitation on the
duration of data storage for personal information).
145. See supra section lI(A)(2).
146. On-line service providers such as AOL, MSN, and CompuServe all offer Internet access to
their subscribers, though the terms of Internet use may be different among the providers. For example,
AOL's Internet connection does not give unrestricted access to Newsgroups.
147. Although today the Internet may allow circumvention of access limitations based on
geography because a user could log onto the Internet from an unrestricted site, one should not assume
that future architectural decisions preclude network segmentation.
148. Cf. Stefik, supra note 67, at 79 (describing current attempts to develop a formal language for
conveying fee information that could then be translated by individual users).
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Lex Informatica offers two particularly valuable enforcement
advantages. First, technological devices can be readily developed to
monitor compliance with both information policy rules and legal norms and
to enforce specific policy choices.'49 Technology allows automated mon-
itoring of information access and use, through techniques such as data
tagging to identify the applicable rules,'-' data sniffers' and search
engines, such as AltaVista52 or Yahoo!, 15 to locate data users or use,
and public or accredited private organizations to verify system compliance.
Other technologies such as secure viewers and encrypted data provide self-
executing enforcement of an information distributor's own data-use
restrictions. And second, in contrast to the ex post enforcement of legal
rules, Lex Informatica relies typically on ex ante measures of self-
execution. Filters and translations, for example, apply to block infor-
mation flows that violate the information policy rules. If a PICS-based
filter is applied to screen the content of a web page, those pages rated
inappropriate for the user will simply not be displayed-only permissible
viewing will take place."l Likewise, translations such as decryption will
only allow execution of actions permissible under the applicable infor-
mation policy rule. In essence, Lex Informatica has efficient self-help
characteristics.
B. Implications
The advantages of Lex Informatica give it strength as a policy
instrument. Technological configurations allow security wrappers to be
placed firmly around information wherever it travels on the network.
PolicyMaker, for example, can be used to assure that information is only
used by authorized individuals for permitted uses. 55 Technological
mechanisms even allow data sources to specify information policies that
impose restrictions on the manipulations of information at remote sites.
149. Such monitoring would, of course, raise significant privacy concerns.
150. See About the DOI (visited Oct. 26, 1997) <http://www.doi.org/about-the-doi.html>
(promoting the Digital Object Identifier (DOI) as "a way to link users of the [digital] materials to the
rights holders themselves to facilitate automated digital commerce in the new digital environment").
151. See SnifferFAQ Version 3.00 (visited Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.iss.net/vd/sniff.html>.
Although packet sniffing is usually conceived as a security threat, the technique may also be used to
search for specific data; see, e.g., Field Exercise Using Snoop, (visited Nov. 13, 1997)
<http://www.vuse.vanderbilt.edu/- apon/courses/cs283s97/assignmentslsniffing.html> (class
exercise for CS283 course at Vanderbilt University, Spring 1997).
152. See Digital Equip. Corp., AltaVista: Main Page (visited Sept. 6, 1997)
<http://www.altavista.digital.con>.
153. See Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! (visited Sept. 6, 1997) <http://www.yahoo.com/>.
154. See FTC Testimony, supra note 38 (statement of Paul Resnick).
155. See supra note 107. PolicyMakerdoes not, however, assure "downstream" activities; it only
verifies the authority of particular users to perform permitted actions.
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Encrypted data may be provided only with a secure viewer, giving the
source control over access to "secure" data even at the remote
location.156 These mechanisms are part of the everyday concerns and
experiences of technologists; technologists have expertise in designing these
systems. With these security features, Lex Informatica offers the possi-
bility of designing enforceable information policy rules on a customized
basis throughout networks. 57
The nuances of Lex Informatica require its use to be a careful
exercise. For example, information policy rules located deep within the
architecture of networks, such as those built into the transmission
protocols, will have greater force than those located at a higher level on
servers or user PCs. The higher-level choices, in general, provide more
flexibility and greater opportunity to customize information flow policies
than rules designed for all network transmissions. However, the flexibility
of technological configurations also means that these technologically
mediated rules can be circumvented. If configuration choices establishing
rules are located on a user's hard drive, users may be able to by-pass the
configuration and establish a different rule. For example, a teenager could
install a new version of Internet browsing software in order to by-pass
parental restrictions installed on the family PC. However, if a techno-
logical rule is built into the network software, the possibilities for
circumvention may be eliminated. For example, a network protocol could
require that content codes be included on all data strings-only information
with selected codings would be transmitted to the same teenager who knew
how to by-pass the local content filter. The teenager in this instance would
not be able to circumvent the network rule.
The power of Lex Informatica to embed nonderogable, public-order
rules in network systems is not benign. Once a technical rule is established
at the network level, the information policy rule is both costly and difficult
to change. All participants in the network must adopt and implement any
new rule. At the higher, local level, changes in information policy are
easier and likely to be less expensive to modify. Yet pressure will exist for
156. See Stefik, supra note 67, at 79-81 (describing new techniques and technology that allow
publishers to distribute encrypted work that only "trusted" users can view or print). JavaApplets, for
example, are programming modules that operate remotely through web browsing software. A data
source could package information with a JavaApplet to preserve the source's control of the data at
remote locations.
157. One interesting consequence pointed out by Professor Mark Lemley is that different policy
rules could, thus, apply to the same conduct by the same person depending on whether the person acted
on-line or off-line. See Lemley, supra note 142, at 318-19. Nevertheless, this is not a cyberspace
phenomenon because actions by the same person in different legal jurisdictions might have different
applicable legal standards. In contrast, however, technical rules can provide a means to avoid the risk
of inadvertently contravening information policies.
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standardization to provide convenience and to minimize user confusion.
In any case, this decision will rest with local users. However, the cost of
change at the local level will be imposed directly on individual users, while
change at the network level will be borne directly by network operators.
In addition, implementation will affect the success or failure of embedded
policy rules.' Software bugs and design defects are weak links in Lex
Informatica. The deeper these occur in network architecture, the more
problematic they are because of the greater difficulty in modifying lower
level architecture. The location decision for an information policy config-
uration is thus significant in many respects.
C. The Relationship Between Lex Informatica and Legal Rules
The advantages and implications of Lex Informatica reflect an inter-
secting relationship between Lex Informatica and law. Lex Informatica
may constrain law's ability to deal with a problem. As seen with the
present Internet architecture and the very existence of the world wide web,
infrastructure decisions that enable multiple paths of communication
diminish the territorial authority to address social policy choices
unilaterally. Lex Informatica may also substitute for law when technologi-
cal rules are better able to resolve policy issues.'59 Lex Informatica can,
for example, offer content filtering rather than distribution censorship."
Law, nonetheless, has an important place in the elaboration of Lex
Informatica. Law may encourage the development of Lex Informatica by
imposing liability on various network actors, and law may provide
immunity or safe harbors for implementation of technical rules. For
instance, in the case of personal information and international privacy
rules,'61 a web site that erroneously reports its practices should be subject
to both criminal and civil fraud claims, but a web site that is labelled and
certified by an accredited third party may enjoy the presumption of
satisfying international standards. 62 Similarly, law may sanction the
evasion of Lex Informatica. If an embedded information policy is
circumvented, then law may intersect to redress this problem by allocating
liability for evasions. For example, computer tampering laws can deal
158. For example, Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 implements PICS technology, while Netscape
Navigator 3.0 does not. This means that PICS technology will be limited by the market share of
Internet Explorer 3.0.
159. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 885 ("Congress's power is contingent upon the available techno-
logies of regulation.").
160. See Resnick, supra note 31, at 62 (observing that filtering systems such as PICS allow
individual users to specify safety and content requirements).
161. See supra subpart 1(B).
162. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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with the problem of third parties setting up mechanisms to corrupt filtering
mechanisms built into web browsers. 63
In the controversial case of content selection," laws similar to the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) in the United States and the recent
communications law in France might have also provided this encourage-
ment function in an unexpected fashion. Although initially rejected by
their respective national courts, these laws allocated liability to Internet
service providers, among others, who distributed indecent material to
minors. Opponents of these measures believed them to be unacceptable
restrictions on free speech. The United States Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision, found the statute overly broad and denounced its
restraint of speech on the Internet." In France, the strong rejection of
the liability provisions emphasized separation of powers but also reflected
concern for speech on the Net.' 66 Ironically, the long-term effect of
these broadly worded court decisions may be counterproductive for
accommodating robust speech and democratic values. While counter-
intuitive to ardent supporters of free speech, provisions imposing liability
would be unlikely to have a significant censorship effect if they were
coupled with a safe harbor for those instituting configuration-choice
mechanisms such as PICS-based filtering. 67 Such laws would more likely
force a change in the Net's structure, rather than impose serious censorship
on the Net's content.'68 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, even
suggested that the existence of technological tools would give Congress
greater regulatory latitude. 69 Because the entire philosophy and present
design of the Net is nevertheless geared to maximize information flow, the
163. Note that the computer tampering laws would apply to nonauthorized system users. See 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (1994); Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 950-
53 (1996). If, for example, evasion of NetNanny or SurfWatch filtering mechanisms takes place by
the family's twelve-year-old, then the problem should belong to the parents. If a hacker changed the
filter mechanism, then the law should sanction the hacker. One should recognize, nevertheless, that
the technology must exist before society can say that the parents bear responsibility to prevent their
child from replacing the Parent Teacher Association's browser with the Penthouse browser.
164. See supra section ll(A)(1).
165. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2347, 2350 (1997) (proclaiming that the "wholly
unprecedented" breadth of the CDA's coverage placed an "unacceptably heavy burden on protected
speech").
166. See Cons. const., Dcision No. 96-378 DC July 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, Public
Library, consti File, and in <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decisions/96/96-378.doc >.
167. Though neither the CDA nor the French law provided this type of safe harbor, the scope of
the respective court's rejections makes consideration of such an approach extremely difficult as a
practical matter.
168. Cf. Lessig, supra note 5, at 888 (claiming that the current cyberspace architecture could be
changed to limit access if society desired such change). But see Weinberg, supra note 24, at 2 (arguing
that blocking software might lead to censorship by intermediaries such as employers and librarians).
169. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the availability of
technology could offer less restrictive means to address the content problem).
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resulting change due to this type of liability measure would most likely be
a widespread implementation of Lex Informatica solutions to the porno-
graphy issue. 7 Technical solutions would put decisions in the hands of
individual citizens-the network users-because the Net community would
seek ways to customize the legal allocations of liability.
In any case, the CDA and the French law also illustrate that liability
rules do not offer an easy legal solution. Public interest must be significant
and, even then, appropriately tailored legislation will be difficult given the
variety and fluidity of the Net."' Drafting a well-defined liability law
will generally pose an extraordinary problem, given that networks create
complex situations which tend to necessitate customized rules. To this
extent, governments may have no choice but to acquiesce to Lex
Informatica solutions.
Despite the initial judicial rejections of the CDA and the French
statute, law can still successfully embed an immutable rule in the
infrastructure when society has a fundamental principle at stake. The
United States's Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994,11 for example, mandates that new telecommunications switching
equipment be wiretap ready.73 The political process in the United States
determined that the police have a fundamental need to obtain access to
communications. Responsibility for this information flow policy was
allocated to telecommunications companies that in turn had to adopt a Lex
Informatica rule at a very low level in their networks. Likewise in France,
the Constitutional Court let stand a provision in the telecommunications act
requiring service providers to offer technical means to filter access to
certain services. 74
In essence, Lex Informatica and legal rules both parallel and overlap
one another. This relationship means that policymakers must add Lex
Informatica to their set of policy instruments and should pursue Lex
170. PICS, for example, owes much of its existence to Senator Exon and his early draft of the
CDA. See Resnick, supra note 31, at 62 (identifying the impetus of PICS as regulatory avoidance);
PICS Statement of Principles (visited Oct. 23, 1997 ) < http://www.w3.org/PICS/principles.html >
(adopted in August 1995, before the enactment of the CDA).
171. To the extent that constitutionality may depend on available technologies, statutory legitimacy
will be a moving target. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 888-89 (describing the changing nature of
eyberspace); see also Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349 (suggesting that Congress should have considered tech-
nological feasibility).
172. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
173. See id. § 1002 ("[A] telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment ... [is]
capable of ... enabling the government ... to intercept ... all wire and electronic communications
.... ). Unlike the features of analog conversations transiting copper wires, digitally switched
communications over fiber optic cables did not readily offer the capability to monitor particular
conversations.
174. Law No. 96-659 of July 26, 1996, art. 15, J.O., July 27, 1996, p. 11384, 11395.
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Informatica norms as an effective substitute for law where self-executing,
customized rules are desirable.
V. Redirecting Public Policy Strategies
Policymakers should accept and take advantage of the distinguishing
features of Lex Informatica and its usefulness for controlling information
flows on global networks. Lex Informatica gives policymakers new tools
to use in the development of information policy; without these new tools,
information flows will marginalize national policymaking authorities.
Moreover, working with Lex Informatica places policymakers at the center
rather than the periphery of solutions. Lex Informatica must be seen as a
distinct source of policy action. Effective channeling of Lex Informatica
requires a shift in the focus of government action away from direct regula-
tion and toward indirect influence. The shift can, nevertheless, still
preserve strong attributes of public oversight.
A. The Sources of Action
Policymakers are accustomed to traditional avenues for establishing
rules through legal regulation. However, legal regulation confronts three
tendencies which increasingly marginalize its effectiveness. First,
technological developments outpace the rate of legal evolution.
Consequently, today's regulations may easily pertain to yesterday's
technologies. Second, today's technology may limit the ability of
government to regulate. For example, digital networks can no longer be
wiretapped like analog phone systems. 5  And finally, information flows
may be impervious to the actions of a single government. As pundits have
observed, the United States Constitution may just be a "speed bump on the
Information Superhighway." 76
Lex Informatica has very different avenues for rule formation. Lex
Informatica's action takes place in standards organizations and in the
market place. Standards determine basic architectural features for
information policy."7 Yet, several different processes can result in the
adoption of standards. 7 There are formal standards organizations such
175. See INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 113, at 97 (describing how digital
information differs from traditional information in that digital information is "inaccessible to the user
without hardware and software tools for retrieval, decoding, and navigation").
176. See Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEXAS L. REV.
873, 874 (1997) (book review) (referring to the "horrible" metaphors used to describe the information
infrastructures and obstacles to information flows).
177. See supra subpart II(A).
178. See Lemley, supra note 143, at 1054-59, 1079 (noting how standards can result from a single
firm's success in a competitive market or from a collaborative industry accord to utilize one standard).
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as those in Europe 79 as well as important industry consortia such as
Committee T1 in the United States."r Market forces influence the accep-
tance of configuration standards, and pressure from both industry represen-
tatives and consumers can affect the direction of standards-setting.' 8 '
B. Shifting Focus
With the technical arena serving as a critical source of information
policy through Lex Informatica rule-making, government policymakers
must shift their focus if they wish to contribute effectively. The promotion
of technical standards must become a key goal. Because technical designs
and choices are made by technologists, government policymakers should
play an important role as public policy advocates promoting policy
objectives. This involves a shift in goals, instrumentalities, and institutions
for policymakers.
1. Goal Shift.-Lex Informatica should shift the focus of policy-
makers away from specific policy-rule content and toward greater
flexibility. In general, flexibility is only undesirable when fundamental
public interests are at stake and the public interest requires rules that
individual participants in the network might not choose themselves."
Policymakers should thus become advocates for flexible standards that
allow for individual policy choices through customization of configurations.
By promoting flexible standards, policymakers advance the capability to
establish information policy rules rather than attempt a specific exercise of
government power to impose a particular substantive decision.
Policymakers must be involved early in the development phases of new
technologies to assure that options and flexibility are maximized."' 3 This
179. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament: On "Standardization and the Global Information Society: The
European Approach," COM(96)359 (final) at 4 ("Formal standards organi[z]ations in Europe,
recogni[z]ed by law at [the] European level ... are CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI." (citation omitted)),
available in Standardization and the Global Information Society (visited Nov. 14, 1997)
<http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legregldocs/96359.htm1>.
180. TI, a privately sponsored organization accredited by the American National Standards
Institute, "develops technical standards and reports regarding interconnection and interoperability of
telecommunications networks at interfaces with end-user systems, carriers, information and enhanced-
service providers, and customer premises equipment." Standards Comm., Ti Telecomm., TI Overview
(visited Sept. 14, 1997) <http://www.tl.org/html/intro.html>.
181. See Lemley, supra note 143, at 1055 ("[IIf companies competing to set an industry standard
are offering different technology, this competition may serve a temporary market-disciplining purpose,
allowing consumers to choose the best technical standard on a one-time basis.").
182. Essentially this means that flexibility does not work when the public interest would otherwise
prohibit freedom of contract.
183. If policymakers arrive late in the development phase, the inertia and committed interests of
the developers may seriously hamper any significant changes.
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involvement does not entail policymakers' seeking to control the design of
new technologies, but this involvement does mean that they instead should
become partners in the development of system capabilities."8
Policymakers must emphasize the creation of an incentive structure
both that encourages new developers to design technologies with informa-
tion flow flexibility and that offers incentives for the implementation of
technologically mediated information policy rules." For example, new
choices in privacy-enhancing technologies are likely to come from entre-
preneurial developers. PICS-based filtering will only become a robust
instrument in the context of information privacy if authors emerge to write
rating terms, services emerge to assign rating labels, and an infrastructure
is established that would support the rating terms and rating labels on the
Internet. t  Similarly, confidence in PICS filtering for information
privacy will rely on the creation of certifying agents. Government can
create both positive and negative incentives to stimulate such technology
development and implementation. Threats of liability tend to be an effec-
tive negative stimulus for industry, while favorable tax treatment or
publicity often act as positive incentives.181 Government may also begin
to look more carefully at accreditation as a way to both channel techno-
logical developments toward public policy goals and to reward developers.
2. Instrumentality Shift.-Policymakers have six significant
approaches to influence the development of technical designs: (1) the bully
pulpit, (2) participation, (3) funding, (4) procurement, (5) regulated
behavior, and (6) regulated standards. For the development of Lex
Informatica information policy rules, policymakers must use strategies and
mechanisms that are different from traditional regulatory approaches.
Government can use the bully pulpit approach to threaten and cajole
industry to develop technical rules. For example, in the context of
184. I am indebted to Professor Lessig for pointing out that such indirect regulation raises nor-
mative issues regarding the exercise of government power. The appropriate role of democratic
government in a technologically mediated society is beyond the scope of this Article, but an important
subject of future work.
185. This point does not suggest that governments must abdicate responsibility to others, but rather
that this instrumentality-the creation of incentives for technical choices-may be far more effective
in achieving desired policy results than a difficult to draft and hard to enforce piece of legislation such
as the Communications Decency Act. See supra note 165.
186. Professor Weinberg nevertheless argues that any PICS-based rating system will be skewed
against the distribution of information. See Weinberg, supra note 24, at 477 (explaining how blocking
software can block desirable information). He ascribes an implicit illegitimacy to all rating labels
because of an inherent subjective element. If arguably there is such an illegitimacy, it should become
irrelevant when a user freely chooses to adopt the particular rating terms, preferences, and rating labels
with knowledge of their meaning and creation.
187. A company will seek to avoid liability or shift its risk while striving to take advantage or
qualify for favorable tax treatment.
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children's programming, the Senate sought to encourage video games
producers to restrain the dissemination of violent programming to
children."s Hearings resulted in an industry decision to create and adopt
the RSAC Is9 and ESRB' systems-two competing rating systems that
allow parents to restrict their children's access to inappropriate material.
The government's bully pulpit resulted in a flexible mechanism that can
provide an information policy rule customized by network participants
rather than an immutable architectural rule. The resulting rating systems
can let parents choose filtering rules without prohibitions on the network's
dissemination of particular content.
The participation approach requires government to work with stand-
ards bodies to help develop technical rules. The Canadian Standards
Association Code for the Protection of Personal Information reflects this
approach.191 The Canadian Standards Association worked with stake-
holders from government, industry, and consumer groups to define the
standard that was ultimately adopted as a Canadian standard."9
Representatives from all sides participated in the actual negotiations.1"3
Policymakers often have significant influence through public funding
decisions. The power of the purse can encourage the development of
particular technological capabilities. For example, the present Internet
routing structure owes its birth to the specifications established by the U.S.
Defense Department. Funding for ARPANET, the precursor to today's
Internet, sought a network that would preserve communications in the event
of local disruptions or a nuclear attack on the United States."9  The
network thus automatically routes around problems and bottlenecks.
Government can also use its power to make the public interest voice
heard through public sector procurement. The government's massive
purchasing power can adopt particular standards. For example, the U.S.
government adopted as a federal standard the Data Encryption Standard
188. See Laura Evenson, Video Game Makers Pledge to Set Up Ratings System, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 10, 1993, at BI.
189. See Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet (visited Sept. 14, 1997)
<http:llwww.rsac.orgl> (describing the RSAC's mission as the empowerment of "the public,
especially parents[,] to make informed decisions" about electronic media).
190. See Entertainment Software Rating Bd., ESRB-Parent's Guide (visited Sept. 14, 1997)
<http://www.esrb.org/parent.html> (illustrating the ESRB's goal to inform parents about the "high-
tech environment of the nineties").
191. CAN/CSA-Q830-1996, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (Mar. 1996)
<http://www.csa.ca/83000-g.htm> [hereinafter CSA Code]; see also Colin Bennett, Privacy Codes,
Privacy Standards and Privacy Laws: The InstrumentsforData Protection and What They Can Achieve,
in VISIONS FOR PRIVACY IN THE 21st CENTURY (Colin Bennett ed., forthcoming 1998).
192. See CSA Code, supra note 191.
193. See id.
194. See Andrew Zimmerman, The Evolution of the Internet, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1997,
at 39, 40, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
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(the famous "DES") originally developed by IBM.'" As a result, if the
government needed encryption, the products it used had to incorporate the
DES. This adoption had an important ripple effect on the private sector.
The government's reliance on the standard gave a certain imprimatur to the
DES, and the private sector consequently adopted it as a security
standard. 96
The regulated-behavior approach provides an indirect but significant
stimulus to Lex Informatica norm-construction. Here the government can
require or prohibit particular activities like the distribution of
pornography' 97 or the unauthorized electronic transfer of money. 98
Behavior regulation leads to a search for the means to assure conforming
practices. Technical rules can become a cornerstone of that assurance.
Finally, policymakers may regulate particular technical standards. For
example, both the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act's
(known as the Digital Telephony Act)' 99 mandate of wiretap-ready capa-
bilities for telecommunications switching equipment and the Clinton
Administration's unsuccessful attempt to impose the Clipper Chip2;' for
access to private communications have looked to set immutable rules in the
basic network architecture. By forcing the technical rule lower in the
network protocol, policymakers can reduce the possibilities of circum-
vention of the Lex Informatica default.
The six different mechanisms for policymakers to influence Lex
Informatica each present different attributes. A traditional regulatory
solution, like government mandated standards, will be the hardest to
accomplish because it requires the government imposition of an immutable
rule in the network infrastructure. In contrast, the bully pulpit approach
and the regulated behavior approach provide greater leeway for network-
driven solutions. Other approaches, such as funding, procurement, or
especially participation, encourage the incorporation of public policy
objectives in the heart of system design and market adoption. In situations
in which public goals call for mandatory rules, policymakers may use
combinations of the various approaches to increase their effectiveness. For
example, if the policy goal is to incorporate an intellectual property rights
management system that is difficult to evade, the system must be
195. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 113, at 121-22 (noting the adoption
of DES as a federal encryption standard).
196. See id. (noting that the banking industry adopted the DES standard).
197. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), did not strike down the portions of the
Communications Decency Act relating to obscenity.
198. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693g-1693h (1994).
199. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
200. Clipper Chip is a proposed encryption tool for electronic communications that would allow
access to information content by law enforcement.
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incorporated with sufficient security at various places in the network.
Government participation in the standards-creation process can assist the
development of a technical standard accepted by all network actors-one
that adopts, for example, mandatory rather than optional data fields for
rating labels.'0 s Governmental influence may be supported by behavior
regulation, namely the imposition of liability if technical means are not
adopted to manage intellectual property rights.'
3. The Institutional Shift.-The shift in focus toward technical
standards as a source of policy rules emphasizes technical fora whose
institutions are not normally associated with governance. The Internet
Engineering Task Force,23  the Internet Society,' the World Wide
Web Consortium,' and traditional standards organizations like ISO,'
ETSI,2  and committees like T1 8  are the real political centers of
201. This would mean that transmission could not occur without a rating label and would facilitate
widespread implementation of a particular Lex Informatica rule.
202. This means that users or distributors of browsers might be liable for infringement if the
browser does not recognize management codes for intellectual property rights. It does not mean that
users should be prohibited from anonymous browsing or fair uses of copyright protected material.
203. The Internet Engineering Task Force is a self-selected organization that is the "protocol
engineering and development arm of the Internet" composed of network designers, operators, vendors,
and researchers. See Internet Eng'g Task Force, Glossary (visited Aug. 30, 1997)
<http://www.ietf.org/glossary.htm#IESG>; InternetEng'g Task Force, Overview ofthe IETF (visited
Aug. 30, 1997) <http:/www.ietf.orgloverview.html>. The IETF engages in the development of new
Internet technical standards.
204. The Internet Society, ISOC, is a non-governmental international organization that seeks to
coordinate internetworking technologies and applications for the Internet. See Internet Soc'y, What Is
the Internet Society? (visited Sept. 14, 1997) <http://www.isoc.org/whatislindex.htrl>. ISOC
promulgates voluntary standards for the Internet that have been developed by the Internet Engineering
Task Force and approved by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (or, in disputed cases, the Internet
Architecture Board). See Internet Soc'y, Internet Society Standards Page Index (visited Sept. 14, 1997)
<http://www.isoc.org/standardslindex.htil >.
205. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international industry consortium run jointly
by the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science in the United States and the Institut national de recherche
en informatique et en automatique in France that seeks to promote standards for the evolution of the
Web and interoperability between WWW products. See World Wide Web Consortium, About the
World Wide Web Consortium [W3C] (visited Sept. 14, 1997) <htp://www.w3c.org/Consortium/>.
W3C produces specifications and reference software. See id.
206. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in Geneva is a world wide federa-
tion of national standards bodies from approximately one hundred countries. Its objective is "to
promote the development of standardization and related activities in the world with a view to facilitating
the international exchange of goods and services, and to developing cooperation in the spheres of
intellectual, scientific, technological and economic activity." International Org. for Standardization,
Introduction to ISO: What Is ISO? (visited Sept. 14, 1997) <http://www.iso.ch/infoe/intro.html>.
ISO's work results in international agreements which are published as standards. See id.
207. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute sets voluntary telecommunications
standards for Europe and cooperates with the European Broadcasting Union and CEN/CENELEC for
broadcasting and office information technology standards. SeeEuropean Telecommunications Standards
Inst., ETS! Statutes (last modified Sept. 10, 1997) <http://www.esti.fr/admruleslstatute.htm>.
208. See supra note 180.
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Lex Informatica. Yet these groups are generally not governmental
organizations. Rather, they tend to be consortia of interested persons and
companies.3 9
For the moment, standards bodies tend to be loosely organized and
have few, if any, universal requirements for membership other than enough
money to attend the various meetings. The organizations generally make
decisions by consensus. When the network community was small and
homogeneous, this process worked well. However, it is unlikely that the
consensus model will persist to function effectively because global
networks now reflect more diverse interests. The commercial politics that
drove standards organizations will be succeeded by far more politicized
social politics. This evolution is likely to make the technical tasks of
standards bodies more difficult to accomplish. The technical community,
willingly or not, now has become a policy community, and with policy
influence comes public responsibility. Policymakers by necessity must pay
closer attention to the activities of these organizations, and they must
participate more aggressively if they wish to push technical developments
in a direction responsive to public goals and the need for customization
capabilities. Policymakers should argue for particular technical capabilities
and functions that will incorporate public objectives (i.e., what the network
can and should do), while leaving the specifics of the protocols to the
engineers (i.e., how the infrastructure will provide the capabilities and
functions). This task will not be easy because the policy and technical
communities have very different cultures.
Finally, in addition to formal standards organizations, technical
decisions can be effectively influenced by ideas generated outside of the
organization structures. Culturally, engineers start designing when
presented with particular goals. Engineers therefore tend to be receptive
to presentations that state the public goal as a design objective. For this
reason, policymakers can and must engage and participate in nontraditional
fora. Conference speeches, workshops, and interest group meetings thus
become key tools of influence impacting the direction of Lex Informatica
development. In essence, the dynamics of Lex Informatica change the
types of activities in which government should be engaged.
VI. Conclusion
Lex Informatica is an existing complex source of information policy
rules on global networks. Lex Informatica provides useful tools to
formulate rules customized for particular situations. Lex Informatica
209. The membership of these organizations by and large reflects domination of industry
representatives.
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allows the coexistence of varying information policies in a heterogeneous
environment. The pursuit of technological rules that embody flexibility for
information flows maximizes public policy options; at the same time, the
ability to embed an immutable rule in system architecture allows for the
preservation of public-order values. These tools can lessen a number of
problems that traditional legal solutions face in regulating the Information
Society. Yet a shift in public policy planning must occur in order for Lex
Informatica to develop as an effective source of information policy rules.
The new institutions and mechanisms will not be those of traditional gov-
ernment regulation. Policymakers must begin to look to Lex Informatica
to effectively formulate information policy rules.
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  593 1997-1998
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  594 1997-1998
